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JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHARITABLE BEQUESTS:
THEORY VS. PRACTICE
ROBERT W. GETTLEMAN*
DAVID R. HODGMAN**
State and federal legislatures have long declared that private, charitable
causes and organizations are to be favored over publicly financed welfare
programs and that charitable gifts should be encouraged. This general policy
is reflected in a number of statutory provisions, including the allowance of
corporate charitable donations,' the deduction of charitable gifts for federal
income tax purposes, 2 and the exemption of charitable and educational
institutions from real estate taxes.3 In addition, the courts of Illinois and
other states have not hesitated to express the strong judicial policy favoring
charities by the adoption of liberal rules of construction and the exercise of
presumptions to uphold charitable gifts.4
It would seem that this policy should result in a lessened burden for
charitable organizations which become parties to will contests or similar
litigation challenging the legality or effectiveness of particular charitable
gifts or bequests. All too often, however, this supposedly predictable result
does not occur. As a result, charities often face the prospect of lengthy and
expensive litigation, forced settlements with contestants, and loss of sub-
stantial donations. The evolution of judicial decisions in Illinois demon-
strates the contrast between theory and practice concerning the general
governmental policy favoring charities and suggests some solutions. This
article will discuss the distinction between theory and practice and analyze
the Illinois Supreme Court's most recent attempt to resolve the problem
which this distinction creates in In re Estate of Tomlinson.5
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In this country, numerous charitable organizations perform many ser-
vices which could be performed solely by government.6 These charities
* Partner, D'Ancona, Pflaum, Wyatt & Riskind; Member of the Illinois Bar; J.D.,
Northwestern University School of Law.
** Associate, D'Ancona, Pflaum, Wyatt & Riskind; Member of the Illinois Bar; J.D.,
Yale Law School.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 § 157.5(m) (1975).
2. I.R.C. § 170.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 §§ 500.1, 500.7 (1975).
4. See cases cited in note 13 infra.
5. 65 Ill. 2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109 (1976).
6. 15 AM. JUR. 2d Charities § 59 (1976).
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discharge many social, welfare, medical research, educational and cultural
functions assumed by government in socialist or totalitarian countries. In the
Soviet Union, for example, all functions mentioned above are performed
solely by the state. That country has but one charity, the Soviet Peace Fund,
whose sole function is to propagandize in foreign countries. 7
The Internal Revenue Service's Cumulative List of Organizations to
which gifts may be deducted for income tax purposes, discloses that over
160,000 charitable organizations operate in the United States, covering
virtually every aspect of our society.8 The great majority of these are
specialized according to objective and locale. In particular, a large number
are private foundations created for estate planning purposes. 9 This latter
category primarily serves to channel funds to other charitable organizations
similar to the way larger organizations channel funds to their smaller
"umbrella" affiliates. The many United Funds, Community Chests, and
religious fund-raising groups shoulder major responsibility for supporting
small organizations involved in activities such as legal services, youth
counseling, crime prevention, day care centers, family counseling and other
direct services to individuals.
Large, specialized organizations such as the American Cancer Society,
the American Heart Association, the American Mental Health Association,
the American Red Cross, and the state affiliates of such organizations,
solicit millions of dollars through mass media advertising as well as personal
contacts with corporations, individuals and foundations. These funds are
channeled to finance broad research efforts, local treatment facilities, and
specialized grants to individual recipients. Other limited purpose organiza-
tions, such as the Urban League, Americans for Democratic Action, Ameri-
cans for Effective Law Enforcement, and the Roger Baldwin Foundation of
the American Civil Liberties Union, seek to influence social change and
governmental policy, and have recently been allowed to increase their
legislative lobbying activities without losing their tax-exempt status. 10 In-
stitutions of higher education depend heavily on private contributions, and
similar to the organizations mentioned above, bear a responsibility which
would otherwise be assumed solely by the state.
Indeed, the failure or inability of government to deal effectively with
social problems constituted the direct cause of the formation of many
charitable organizations. For example, the John Howard Association was
formed in England in 1790 as the result of the British government's neglect
7. Chicago Sun Times, May 22, 1977, at 76, cols. 1-2.
8. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS (1977).
9. Id.
10. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 501(h)(1).
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of its prison system." Similar organizations emerged in this country in
response to the prohibition and civil rights problems as they erupted.12
State and federal legislatures have favored private charitable causes,
often at a cost represented by the indirect loss of tax revenues or direct
government grants. Not only do charities perform tasks which would other-
wise be performed by government, but the large number of charitable
organizations create a diversity and ingenuity which might well be lost in the
maze of government bureaucracy. As a direct result of governmental
favoritism for charities, each citizen becomes an indirect contributor to all
charitable, tax-exempt organizations.
Although this forced contribution is caused mostly by favored tax
treatment, other non-tax policies (both legislative and judicial) result in an
additional indirect burden to consumers. For example, the allowance of
corporate charitable contributions increases the prices charged by corporate
businesses while decreasing profitability and, as a result, shareholder divi-
dends.
A more controversial example of forced consumer support of charity is
found in the inclusion of charitable contributions as a cost when utility
companies are computing their rates. The courts of the several states have
decided differently on this practice. The courts of ten states have upheld the
inclusion of charitable gifts by utilities for rate-making purposes. 13 By
contrast, four states have disallowed the inclusion of charitable donations as
operating expenses.14 These jurisdictions justify this holding on the theory
that to allow such inclusion would amount to "an involuntary levy on the
rate payers."' 5 In 1973, the Illinois Supreme Court followed the latter trend
by holding that utilities could not include charitable contributions as operat-
11. E. STOCKDALE, A STUDY OF BEDFORD PRISON I (1977).
12. 1. FISHER, PROHIBITION AT ITS WORST 1 (1926); B. HABENSTREIT, ETERNAL VIGILANCE:
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION IN ACTION 1 (1971).
13. In re Diamond State Tel. Co., 51 Del. 525, 536-37, 149 A.2d 324, 331 (1959); Miami v.
Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 208 So. 2d 249, 259 (Fla. 1968); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State
Corp. Comm'n, 192 Kan. 39, 73, 386 P.2d 515, 545 (1963); New England Tel. & Tel. v.
Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 484-85, 275 N.E.2d 493, 521 (1971); United Gas Corp.
v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 Miss. 405, 434, 127 So. 2d 404, 416 (1961); Northern
States Power Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 71 N.D. 1, 22, 298 N.W. 423, 434 (1941); Public
Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. 150, 161, 153 A.2d 801, 809 (1959); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v.
Department of Pub. Util., 12 N.J. 568, 569, 97 A.2d 602, 618 (1953); United Transit Co. v.
Nunes, 99 R.I. 501, 513-14, 209 A.2d 215, 222 (1965); Board of Supervisors v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 196 Va. 1102, 1118, 87 S.E.2d 139, 149 (1955).
14. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 669, 401 P.2d 353, 375,
44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 22-23 (1965); Central Me. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 234,
136 A.2d 726, 731 (1957); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 230 Md.
395, 414-15, 187 A.2d 475, 485 (1963); Carey v. Corporation Comm'n, 168 Okla. 487, 492, 33
P.2d 788, 794 (1934).
15. 230 Md. at 414, 187 A.2d at 485.
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ing expenses.' 6 However, the legislature, in effect, overruled that decision
in its next session. 7
Thus, even when the favorable treatment of charitable organizations
results in forced contributions by consumers and lost tax revenues, govern-
ment shows little reluctance in carrying out the general policy. However, it
has been left to the courts to determine the specific judicial rules which will
govern the legal construction of charitable bequests.
THE ALTERNATIVES OF JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
A common source of litigation involving charities occurs when a will
or trust instrument provides a gift to a particular organization under an
incorrect or non-existent name. 8 This may result in competing claims by
various charities as to which organization was intended to receive the
funding, or by the residuary takers or heirs on the theory of lapsed legacy or
intestacy.
In deciding such questions, a court may employ a variety of rules of
construction favorable to charities. Perhaps most prominent among such
rules is the doctrine of cy pres. Simply expressed, the rule states that: If the
specific object of a charitable gift is impossible to accomplish and the donor
had a general charitable intent broader than the specific beneficiary or object
named, the court will apply the gift as nearly as possible to the impossible
object.' 9
Perhaps because it embodies significant common sense, this principle
has apparently existed in western civilization at least since the time of
Rome.20 In the context of testamentary gifts, the doctrine appears to be
founded upon two principles: (1) testamentary intent should be protected
and discharged regardless of whether the bequest is charitable or non-
charitable; 2 1 and (2) charities should receive special favor under the law
because of the benefits they generate for society as a whole. 22 The potential
16. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 461, 481, 303 N.E.2d
364, 375 (1973).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 41 (1975).
18. See Note, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 310 (1939) [hereinafter cited as
Revaluation].
19. See generally G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 431-442 (2d ed.
1960) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT & BOGERT]; IV A. SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 395-401 (3d
ed. 1%7) [hereinafter cited as ScoTr].
20. Late Corp. of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56 (1889); see generally
Fisch, The Cy Pres and Changing Philosphies, 51 MICH. L. REV. 375 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
Changing Philosophies].
21. See Bergendahl v. Stiers, 8 111. 2d 257, 133 N.E.2d 280 (1956). In Bergendahl, the court
stated: "of course the paramount rule of testamentary construction is that the intention of the
testator, as expressed in his will, governs the distribution of his estate . Id. at 263, 133
N.E.2d at 283.
22. Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 382 (1959) [hereinafter cited
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for conflict between these two principles is demonstrated by one of the
derivatives of the intent rule, a derivative sometimes woodenly stated by the
courts as follows: "[Tihe power to make wills is vested in testators and not
courts." 23 The definition and interpretation of one of the prerequisites of cy
pres application, general charitable intent, determine which of these princi-
ples governs.
In Roman and Medieval times, charitable gifts were furnished special
protection because of the benefits which the donor derived from them, such
as preserving one's memory24 or saving one from the unpleasant rigors of
eternal damnation. 25 The foundation of the cy pres doctrine in England was
the King's prerogative power to ensure justice to his subjects. 26 Apparently,
this power was gradually shifted to the Chancellor except where a gift was
void because it was devoted to an illegal purpose, contrary to public policy
or made to charity generally.27 As administered by the Chancellor, judicial
cy pres became an intent-enforcing device, whereas prerogative cy pres,
exercised by the Crown, was not so limited.28 Prerogative cy pres was often
employed in connection with religious persecution. One of the best exam-
ples of this was the case of Decosta v. DePas29 in which prerogative cy pres
was exercised to divert a gift intended to be used to educate Jews in their
religion to a gift to educate Christians in their religion.
The distinction between judicial and prerogative cy pres was apparently
confused in early American cases.3" Because of this confusion and the threat
which prerogative cy pres posed to the institution of private property, the cy
pres doctrine did not enjoy immediate acceptance in the United States. 31
However, the doctrine now appears to be well accepted and is based upon
the theories of intent and social benefit. 3
2
As originally applied in the United States, cy pres application required
three conditions: (1) a charitable trust, (2) a general charitable intent, and
(3) the impossibility, impracticality, or illegality of following the testator's
express directions. 33 The courts still give lip service to the right of individu-
as Changing Concepts]; Willard, Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Pres, 8 HARV. L. REV. 69
(1894) [hereinafter cited as Willard].
23. In re Estate of Tomlinson, 30 Ill. App. 3d 502, 505-06, 333 N.E.2d 663, 665, rev'd, 65
Ill. 2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109 (1976).
24. Late Corp, of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. I, 52 (1889); Revaluation,
supra note 18, at 309.
25. See Willard, supra note 28, at 72-79.
26. Revaluation, supra note 18, at 303-04.
27. Id. at 304.
28. Id. at 305.
29. 228 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754).
30. Revaluation, supra note 18, at 306.
31. Id. at 307-08.
32. Changing Concepts, supra note 22, at 382.
33. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 19, at §§ 431-442; ScoTT, supra note 19, at §§ 395-401.
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als to dispose of private property (which is often suggested by reference to
the "dead hand" of the testator).34 However, the virtual elimination of the
trust requirement and the relaxation of qualifications standards for general
charitable intent have significantly broadened the powers of the courts in
many states to save charitable bequests against non-charitable claimants. 35
The requirement of a trust has been abandoned to the extent that the courts
have applied cy pres to outright bequests by stating that such gifts are
"subject to a trust" or by implying a trust. 36 In addition, in Illinois 37 as in
other jurisdictions, 38 the definition of general charitable intent has been
substantially broadened.
IN RE ESTATE OF TOMLINSON: 39 THE ILLINOIS APPROACH
The tension between these possibly conflicting theoretical bases, the
one emphasizing the individual's right to dispose of private property and the
other emphasizing the collective needs of society, has been judicially re-
solved, in recent years, increasingly in favor of the collective good. 40 A
recent example is found in the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in In re
Estate of Tomlinson.41 In that case, the testator left her residuary estate to
the "Cancer Research Fund absolutely and forever." It was stipulated at
trial that no organization was ever known by that name, but the trial court
was persuaded that Cancer Research Fund was a misdesignation for the
American Cancer Society and awarded the residue to that charity.42 The
appellate court reversed in favor of the heirs at law and held that the legacy
lapsed for lack of evidence of whom the testator actually meant by the
misdesignation. 43 However, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's decision in favor of the American Cancer Society by application of
cy pres. In so doing, the supreme court has clearly brought Illinois within
the group of jurisdictions which employs a liberal definition of general
charitable intent. The rule adopted by the court is found in the following
excerpt from the Tomlinson decision: "[A]lthough the bequest to the
Cancer Research Fund cannot be carried out, we find in the Will evidence
that the testator did not intend that the bequest should completely fail under
34. Changing Philosophies, supra note 20, at 383-84.
35. Changing Concepts, supra note 22, at 383.
36. Id.
37. In re Estate of Tomlinson, 65 I1. 2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109 (1976).
38. See Howard Savings Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1960).
39. 65 Ill. 2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109 (1976).
40. Changing Philosophies, supra note 20, at 384-85.
41. 65 Il1. 2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109 (1976).
42. Id. at 389-90, 359 N.E.2d at 112 (reviewing 30 Ill. App. 3d 502, 503, 333 N.E.2d 663,
665 (1976)).
43. 30 Il1. App. 3d 502, 503, 333 N.E.2d 663, 665.
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such circumstances. 44 As evidence for this finding, the court cited two
principle facts. First, the will contained no provision for disposition in the
event of failure of the charitable bequest. Second, if the bequest had failed it
would have passed to the testatrix's heirs, contrary to the express intention
of the testatrix to disinherit her heirs.45
Although it does not appear that the Illinois Supreme Court has gone so
far as to place the burden of proving an absence of general charitable intent
on the heirs at law, it has gone a long way toward that result. Presumably,
the question of cy pres would not ordinarily arise if a will contained specific
directions in the event of failure or impossibility. 46 Moreover, the fact that
the Tomlinson will also contained a disinheritance clause does not signifi-
cantly lessen the impact of the decision in this regard because any bequest to
a charity results in at least a partial, and obviously intentional, disinheri-
tance of the testatrix's heirs. Clearly, the Illinois Supeme Court did not
require or suggest any evidence other than that which implied that the
testatrix would have preferred that the bequest remain in charitable chan-
nels. This decision is far more liberal than previous Illinois cases.
47
44. 65 Il. 2d at 389, 359 N.E.2d at 112.
45. The testator's will provided the following: "All of my heirs at law which I have omitted
in my Last Will . . . , I have done so intentionally and 1, therefore, hereby generally and
specifically disinherit each, any and all persons whomsoever claiming to be or may be deter-
mined to be my heirs at law." 30 I1. App. 3d at 504, 333 N.E.2d at 665.
46. Admittedly, most professionally drawn wills direct that lapsed legacies pass under the
residuary clause in the will. However, such clauses are included in wills to prevent the
application of the laws of intestacy and are not probative of the question of the testator's intent
had he anticipated the impossibility of accomplishing the charitable gift.
47. For example, in Chicago Daily News Fresh Air Fund v. Kerner, 305 Ill. App. 237, 27
N.E.2d 310 (1940), the charitable legatee declined to take the legacy because it had determined
to cease its operations. The court refused to apply the gift cy pres because the principle
claimant to the bequest was not organized until after the testator died and had a charitable
purpose expressed in its charter "welfare of infants and children," which the court charac-
terized as "much narrower" than the objects of the named legatee, to provide charitable aid to
the poor. 305 Ill. App. at 245, 27 N.E.2d at 314. The legacy passed to the testator's heirs in spite
of the fact that the trustee of the testator's residuary estate had supplied to the testator, at the
testator's request, a list of charities from which the testator selected one, the clear implication
being that the testator had no specific charitable legatee in mind and that the one named was not
the essence of the gift. Moreover, the entire residue of the testator's will was directed to charity
and there were no directions for other disposition in the event of impossibility of the specific
object.
Similarly, in Quimby v. Quimby, 175 Il1. App. 367 (1912), cy pres application was denied in
connection with the following bequest:
I further direct by said executor to give and convey all the remainder of my estate,
goods and chattels to my beloved grandson Walter Reynolds Quimby, whenever he
may appear and make claim to or for the same. If, however, at the expiration of five
years from the date of my decease, my said grandson does not so appear and at the
end of such period of five years it is not known that my grandson is living, I hereby
direct that all that may remain of the money and amounts due me which may be
collected by my said executor or trustee, with the accumulated interest, shall be paid
to the Chicago Waif's Mission and Training School.
175 Ill. App. at 368. Clearly, the testator intended to disinherit her heirs at law from the residue
of her estate if the contingency described did not occur (which it did not). Further, it was
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Analysis of Tomlinson
Although this liberalization of the cy pres doctrine will undoubtedly
have a profound effect on Illinois charities and, thus, Illinois society in
general, the decision in Tomlinson also raises many questions. In the past,
the law of Illinois has required lesser certainty to sustain charitable bequests
than non-charitable ones.4K Nonetheless, in spite of substantial evidence
which would have supported an award based upon the trial court's theory of
misdesignation, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the trial court's theory
and relied upon cy pres. 49 The testatrix in Tomlinson had no record of past
contributions to the American Cancer Society or any other form of support
for or participation in its activities. 50 However, the record established that
there was an office of the American Cancer Society in the city of Peoria
where the testator had lived. In addition, it was shown that many other
courts had construed similar misdesignations to have been intended for the
American Cancer Society. 51 This fact established that the American Cancer
Society was commonly associated with cancer research in the minds of
many and, thus, was indirect evidence of the intent of the testator. Further,
the record included an exhaustive list of cancer research organizations
located in the United States and elsewhere, which strongly implied that the
American Cancer Society was the only cancer society of which there was
any probability that the testator had any knowledge. 52 Moreover, the Ameri-
can Cancer Society urged the Illinois Supreme Court in its briefs to take
judicial notice of the extensive operations of the American Cancer Society
as further evidence that it was the only probable intended legatee. 53
In short, sufficient evidence was present in the record before the
Illinois Supreme Court to have supported a holding that Cancer Research
equally clear that there were no directions for a gift over or a reverter in the event that the
specific object became impossible. Yet, the court concluded that the residue must pass accord-
ing to the laws of intestacy. In so doing, the court also concluded that a general charitable intent
could not be implied from the sole fact that the stated purpose of the named beneficiary was to
aid needy boys and girls. That statement clearly indicates that the test for general charitable
intent employed by the Quimby court was narrower by far than that employed by the Tomlin-
son court. Notably, the Quimby court supported its ruling by stating:
To hold otherwise would so extend the application of the rule of cy pres as to compel
courts to administer charitable bequests in every case where the particular object
named in the will is incapable of taking, unless apt words negativing such a course
should be used in the will.
175 Ill. App. at 373.
48. Woman's Union Missionary Soc. v. Mead, 131 Ill. 338, 23 N.E. 603 (1890); Hitchcock
v. Board of Home Missions, 259 Ill. 288, 293, 102 N.E. 741, 743-44 (1913).
49. 65 111. 2d at 389, 359 N.E.2d at 112.
50. 30 II!. App. at 506, 333 N.E.2d at 666.
51. 65 Iil. 2d at 386, 390, 359 N.E.2d at 111, 113.
52. Id. at 390, 359 N.E.2d at 113.
53. Petitioner's Brief for Leave to Appeal at 5, In re Tomlinson, 65 III. 2d 382, 359 N.E.2d
109 (1976).
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Fund was a misdesignation for the American Cancer Society. Instead, the
court chose to decide the case on the basis of cy pres, a result based upon
reasons of policy rather than traditional rules of construction. If the court
had chosen to uphold the trial court's theory of misdesignation, however,
charities would have been forced in the future to attempt to prove that they
were the intended legatee whenever a misdesignation occurred. In light of
the growing complexity of our society and the beneficial, but nonetheless
astounding, multiplicity of charitable organizations, the cost of determining
the most probable intended legatee would be enormous.
54
Modern charities engage in a variety of fund-raising activities, includ-
ing mass advertising and the utilization of willing but inexperienced volun-
teers, neither of which produces accurate evidence helpful in determining
intended legatees in cases of misdesignation. Such communications fre-
quently fix in the listener's mind the need for charitable donations with
respect to a particular social concern but fail to imprint the exact technical
name of the organization which inspired his interest. This growing potential
for cause-oriented misdesignations is evidenced by the fact that at least one
major charity, the American Heart Association, has filed a registered trade-
mark in the name of a commonly used misdesignation, the "Heart Fund." 55
As a consequence, it should be expected that there will be increasing
numbers of bequests to unknown organizations, such as the Cancer Re-
search Fund, to which cy pres will be applied in the future.
In many cases, identification of the intended legatee would be impos-
sible or prohibitively expensive when the size of many bequests is compared
to the cost of research into the life and specific organizational interests of the
testator. The rule set forth by the Illinois Supreme Court in Tomlinson is
clearly the most socially advantageous and further demonstrates the con-
tinued trend away from the concept of private property toward a recognition
of society's own interest in upholding and preserving private charitable
bequests.
However, applying the cy pres doctrine in Tomlinson was easy because
the American Cancer Society is a very large and well-known organization
which distributes funds throughout the United States and supports a variety
of diverse research and educational efforts. The courts should fully recog-
54. In re Estate of Samuels, No, 76 P 5007 (Ill. Cir. Ct., filed Dec. 30, 1976). In Samuels
the testator left her residuary estate, expected to be approximately $100,000, to four entities:
"CANCER FUND, Chicago, Illinois," "BLIND FUND, Chicago, Illinois," "HEART FUND,
Chicago, Illinois," and "MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS, Chicago, Illinois," Four charities claimed
the bequest to the "CANCER FUND," four claimed the bequest to the "BLIND FUND" and
three claimed the bequest to the "HEART FUND."
55. U.S. Trade Mark Reg. No. 594645, Registered August 31, 1954, Renewed August 31,
1974.
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nize that difficult choices may have to be made in subsequent cases involv-
ing smaller, lesser known charities with similar names and objectives.
Most of the services supported by charitable gifts are not controversial.
However, charitable giving also supports a variety of private organizations
which generate diverse academic, professional, sociological and artistic
views and expressions. These organizations are controversial and cannot be
funded easily by governmental organizations directly dependent upon public
appropriations and controlled by publicly elected or appointed officials.
Such organizations and officials are vulnerable to popular pressure and
majority whim. Private institutions, to the contrary, are "designed to pro-
duce a babble of intellectual and artistic claims in the name of truth...
[and] challenges to authority.. "56 and, as such, are vitally important to a
system such as ours which places enormous value on freedom of speech and
the marketplace of ideas approach to social change.
The effect of the shift away from a theory of misdesignation (which
places primary emphasis on respect for the "dead hand" of the testator) to
cy pres application results in a new system of allocation of charitable
bequests administered by the courts, often with participation by the state
attorney general. 57 Although private charitable organizations would certain-
ly have the right to intervene in such proceedings, it seems likely that only
the larger institutions would do so since smaller ones usually would be
unable to afford the costs and expenses involved. As in Tomlinson, the
predictable result is a cy pres award to the large charity.
This result finds logic in the realities of our times. Many charitable
causes, especially those dealing with medical research, are dominated by
large, highly visible umberella-type organizations which are established to
provide and channel sufficient resources to meet the technological chal-
lenges involved. Not only are such organizations properly presumed to be
the most likely intended donee, but such organizations are usually more
knowledgeable and efficient than the courts in allocating funds where they
are most needed. A presumption favoring large charitable organizations in
fields dominated by such groups is further supported by the fact that mass
media communications have created millions of potential donors who have
had no previous contact with individual charities. This makes it impossible
to prove who the specifically intended donee was.
CONCLUSION
Although such an application of cy pres will effectuate the intention of
the testator and serve the interests of society in most circumstances, the
56. Pifer, The Jeopardy of Private Institutions, reprinted from CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF
NEW YORI, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1970).
57. 65 Ill. 2d at 387-88, 359 N.E.2d at I11.
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court should not overlook the advisability of applying the rules of construc-
tion for misdesignated bequests in appropriate cases. The cardinal rule of
construction, giving effect to the testator's intent, should not be ignored in
cases in which sufficient evidence is presented to the court to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the testator intended to make a gift to an identifi-
able specific charity. By resisting the temptation to apply the doctrine of cy
pres universally in such cases, the courthouse doors will remain open to a
smaller organization which can demonstrate that it was the intended benefi-
ciary, the likelihood of expensive litigation would be minimized, and the
desired diversity of effort would be preserved.
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